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Abstract Although forgetting in the short term is a ubiqui-
tous phenomenon, its exact causes remain undecided. The
aim of the present study was to test the temporal decay
hypothesis according to which memory traces fade away
with time when attention is diverted by concurrent activities.
In two experiments involving complex span tasks, adults
were asked to remember series of items (either letters or
spatial locations) while verifyingmultiplications. The duration
of processing was manipulated by presenting multiplications
either in word (three × four 0 twelve) or digit (3 × 4 0 12)
format, the former taking longer to solve, while the time
available to restore memory traces after each operation was
kept constant across conditions. In line with the temporal
decay hypothesis, the longer solution times elicited by solving
word multiplications resulted in poorer recall performance.
The fact that longer processing times had a comparable effect
on both verbal and visuospatial memory and that the differ-
ence between conditions remained stable from the first to the
last trials makes it difficult to account for these findings by
assuming that forgetting is exclusively due to representation-
based interference or buildup of proactive interference.
Keywords Workingmemory . Dual-taskperformance . Short
termmemory .Memory
The fact that information temporarily maintained for immediate
use or recall rapidly vanishes from memory is a ubiquitous
phenomenon. Surprisingly, the exact causes of this forgetting
remain undecided. A venerable tradition attributed forgetting
to the sheer passage of time, assuming that memory traces
suffer from a temporal decay (J. Brown, 1958; Conrad, 1967;
Peterson & Peterson, 1959). However, further appraisals of
the findings on which this hypothesis was based led to the
conclusion that, currently, there is no evidence for temporal
decay in working memory (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2009;
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009). Thus, modern psy-
chology has rejected this hypothesis and commonly assumes
that forgetting is due not to decay (Brown & Lewandowsky,
2010), but to representation-based interference created by
the intervening events occurring between encoding and
retrieval (Nairne, 1990; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006; Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2008).
However, some recent studies have cast doubt on the idea
that there is no temporal decay in the short term by reporting
facts that are difficult to explain without any effect of time
per se (Cowan & AuBuchon, 2008; Ricker & Cowan,
2010). Moreover, within the time-based resource-sharing
(TBRS) model framework, we have gathered a large body
of evidence demonstrating that, in complex span tasks,
recall performance is a function of the time during which
intervening activities occupy attention, suggesting that
memory traces suffer from a temporal decay while attention
is diverted away (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004;
Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007;
Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011; Vergauwe, Barrouillet, &
Camos, 2009, 2010).
The aim of the present study was to provide direct evi-
dence that memory traces decay with time while attention is
diverted by intervening activities. For this purpose, we used
a complex span task paradigm in which participants are
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presented with memory items for further recall, each item
being followed by a distractive task. Previous studies have
shown that recall performance in this kind of span task
depends on the ratio between the time taken to perform the
distractive task (i.e., the processing time) and the free time
available to reactivate memory traces (i.e., the refreshing
time): The higher this ratio, the poorer the recall perfor-
mance (Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2007; Barrouillet, Portrat,
& Camos, 2011). One possible account for this relation is to
assume that memory traces decay with time. Processing will
prevent refreshing processes from counteracting this decay,
with longer processing resulting in more forgetting. How-
ever, the fact that memory performance depends on a time
ratio does not constitute definite evidence for a temporal
decay of memory traces. It could be imagined that the
memoranda suffer not from decay, but from representation-
based interference created by encoding the distractor items
and that some time-dependent refreshing processes could
repair the damages created by this interference. In this case,
memory performance would not depend on processing time
but should increase with refreshing time (Lewandowsky &
Oberauer, 2009; Lewandowsky et al., 2009; Oberauer &
Kliegl, 2006). Thus, demonstrating that memory traces de-
cay with time requires showing that, while refreshing time is
kept constant, increasing processing time results in poorer
recall performance. For this purpose, we took advantage of
the fact that it takes longer to solve multiplications presented
in a word (three × four) than a digit (3 × 4) format. Provid-
ed that the operands are small (here, we used operands up to
a maximum of 5), there is a large consensus in the literature
that it should be assumed that both types of operations are
solved through the same process of retrieval from long-term
memory of arithmetic facts that are stored in a verbal format
(Dehaene, 1992). The longer solving times for word
multiplications have been attributed to encoding differences
(Noel, Fias, & Brysbaert, 1997).
In a first experiment, participants were presented with a
complex span task in which they had to remember series of
consonants. After presentation of each letter, they were
asked to verify three successive multiplications presented
either in digits (short processing time) or in words (long
processing time) and to give their response (either “correct”
or “false”) by pressing keys on a keyboard (Fig. 1). In order
to keep refreshing times equal in both conditions, each
response in the processing task was followed by a con-
stant delay of 800 ms before the appearance of the next
multiplication or letter. When refreshing times are kept
constant, the temporal decay hypothesis predicts more
forgetting and poorer recall with a longer processing
time. Thus, we predicted poorer recall in the word mul-
tiplication condition.
Experiment 1
Participants
Thirty-three undergraduate students (27 females; mean age 0
20.1 years, SD 0 2.1) at the University of Geneva participated
for partial course credit.
Materials and procedure
Participants were presented with 16 series of five conso-
nants to be remembered that were randomly assigned to the
two conditions determined by the nature of the multiplica-
tions to be verified (either in digits or in words), with 8 series
per condition. Series were constructed in such a way that
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Fig. 1 Trial design for the two
experiments. Each memory item
(letters for Experiment 1 and
spatial displays for Experiment
2) was presented for 1 s and was
followed, after a delay of
100 ms, by three multiplications
for verification. Participants
gave a manual response (true or
false) by pressing appropriate
keys on a keyboard. The
following multiplication or
memory item was displayed
800 ms after this keypress. The
figure illustrates the fact that
processing times (gray lines) are
longer for multiplications in
words (right panel) than for
those in digits (left panel)
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acronyms and alphabetically ordered strings were avoided.
Each consonant was followed by three multiplication prob-
lems and their solution (e.g., 3 × 5 0 15). Both operands of
the multiplication problems were smaller than or equal to 5.
Problems involving 0 or 1 and tie problems (e.g., 3 × 3)
were excluded. Commuted pairs (e.g., 3 × 5 and 5 × 3) were
considered as two different problems. Half of the problems
were presented with a wrong answer selected from the
correct multiplication table (e.g., 3 × 5 0 10). Problems
containing the same components could not be displayed
within the same burst of three multiplications that followed
each letter. During the experimental phase, the 16 series of
letters were randomly assigned to the 16 trials (8 per condi-
tion) that were presented in a random order.
Before each trial, participants were informed about the
format of the forthcoming multiplications (words or digits).
A ready signal (an asterisk) was centered on-screen for
750 ms, followed by a white screen for 100 ms. Then the
first letter was displayed for 1,000 ms, followed after a delay
of 100 ms by three successive multiplications, by another
letter for 1,000 ms and, after a delay of 100 ms, by three
other multiplications, and so on until the end of the series.
Participants were asked to read aloud each letter when it
appeared and to verify the answers of the multiplications as
quickly as possible, without sacrificing accuracy, by pressing
either the A or the L key for “correct” and “false,” respective-
ly. These keypresses removed the problem from the screen,
which remained empty for 800 ms, creating a constant delay
before the presentation of the next multiplication or letter.
However, if participants had not responded within a time limit
of 1,000 ms for the digit multiplications and 1,500 ms for the
word multiplications (these values were fixed from a pretest),
the problem disappeared from screen, but participants were
informed at the beginning of the experiment that their re-
sponse was still recorded for a limited amount of time. In
reality, the experiment did not proceed until the participant
had given his or her response, which was followed by the
800-ms delay. This was done to create the illusion that the task
was totally computer paced, thus avoiding the possibility that
participants would postpone the arithmetic task to reactivate
memory traces. At the end of the series, the word rappel
(recall) was displayed on-screen, and participants had to type
the letters in correct order by filling an empty five-slot frame.
The score was the number of series of letters recalled in correct
order. Besides the letters recalled, reaction times and accuracy
during the multiplication task were recorded.
Results and discussion
Six participants who had fewer than 80% correct responses in
the multiplication task were discarded from the analyses. As
we expected, the remaining 27 participants took longer to
solve multiplications in word than in digits (1,448 ms, SD 0
219 ms, and 944 ms, SD 0 124 ms, respectively), F(1, 26) 0
287.40, p < .001. In line with the temporal decay hypothesis,
these longer processing times resulted in poorer recall perfor-
mance, with a rate of series correctly recalled of .45 (SD 0 .28)
and .63 (SD 0 .30) for the word and digit conditions, respec-
tively, F(1, 26) 0 35.84, p < .001. However, verifying word
multiplications involved a higher rate of errors (10%, SD 0
5%, and 6 %, SD 0 4%, for words and digits, respectively),
F(1, 26) 0 27.18, p < .001, something that could have an
impact on recall performance. Indeed, it has been shown that
errors are usually followed by posterror processes that occupy
the attentional bottleneck and delay the processing of the next
stimulus (Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2008; Laming, 1979).
Because this posterror processing would take place during
the refreshing periods following eachmultiplication, the higher
number of errors committed with words could have shortened
the periods of refreshing in this condition, resulting in poorer
recall performance (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2009). Thus,
in order to equalize the rate of errors between conditions, we
excluded all the trials on which a given participant committed
more than one error out of the 15 multiplications, as well as
those participants who had fewer than 3 remaining trials in one
or both conditions after this trimming procedure had been
applied. There were 19 remaining participants with a mean of
5.5 trials in the word condition and 6.7 trials in the digit
condition. The mean processing times for these remaining trials
were 1,448 ms (SD 0 252 ms) and 918 ms (SD 0 115 ms) for
the word and digit conditions, respectively, F(1, 18) 0
169.09, p < .001. Although the rate of error no longer differed
between conditions (3% in both condition), F < 1, the effect
on recall performance remained. The rate of series correctly
recalled was still lower in the word than in the digit condition
(.54, SD 0 .29, and .74, SD 0 .24, respectively), F(1, 18) 0
25.12, p < .001. It is worth noting that this effect was still
significant when the order of recall was not taken into account
(.59, SD 0 .31, and .82, SD 0 .22, for the word and digit
conditions, respectively), F(1, 18) 0 18.73, p < .001, indicat-
ing that the observed effect was due not to order errors, but to
recall failures, as a temporal decay hypothesis would predict.
Although these results support the temporal decay hypoth-
esis, it could be argued that they result from representation-
based interference. Such an account would assume that the
representations resulting from reading word numbers interfere
more with the memory traces of letters than do the represen-
tations resulting from processing numbers in their Arabic
format. Two reasons could be put forward. First, number
words are themselves made of letters and could have created
more interference than did digits. Second, letters are most
probably maintained in their phonological code. Even though
prominent theories assume that both digit and word formats
activate the same verbal code storing arithmetic facts
(Dehaene, 1992), other theories have argued that phonological
representations of numbers are automatically activated from
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the graphemic representation of words, but to a lesser extent
from the ideographic representation of digits (Fias, Brysbaert,
Geypens, & d’Ydewalle, 1996). Following the latter hypoth-
esis, the phonological codes activated by number words
would blur the memory traces of letters to a greater extent
than would digits, thus leading to more forgetting.
To discard this alternative explanation, we replicated our
findings with a memory material that does not involve
phonological coding. We designed a second experiment in
which the memoranda consisted not of letters, but of spatial
locations defined by 12 squares. These squares were pre-
sented on-screen at random locations to avoid any possibility
of verbal coding by localizing a given square by its coordi-
nates in the matrix usually used in spatial memory tasks
(Darling, Della Sala, & Logie, 2007; see Fig. 1). Each spatial
location was presented for 1 s by turning one of these squares
blue, followed by three multiplications presented in either
word or digit format. Because working memory spans are
lower for spatial than for verbal information (Logie, 1995;
Vergauwe et al., 2010), participants were presented with a
series of only three spatial locations (and thus, nine multi-
plications). Because the temporal decay hypothesis assumes
that both visuospatial and verbal memory traces are affected by
the passage of time (Vergauwe et al., 2010), we predicted
poorer recall performance in the wordmultiplication condition.
Experiment 2
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students (30 females; mean age 0
21.1 years, SD 0 2.8) at the University of Geneva participated
for partial course credit.
Materials and procedure
This second experiment used the same procedure as Experi-
ment 1, except that participants memorized not five letters, but
3 out of 12 spatial locations defined by squares presented at
fixed random locations on-screen. Each spatial location was
presented by turning one of these squares blue for 1,000 ms,
followed by three multiplications. In the recall phase, partic-
ipants were presented with the 12 squares and had to click on
the squares they had seen before in correct order. Each time
participants clicked on a square, it turned blue. When partic-
ipants had clicked on 3 squares, the experiment proceeded.
Results
Two participants who had fewer than 80% correct responses in
the multiplication task were discarded from the analyses. As in
the first experiment, it took longer to verify multiplications
presented in words than those presented in digits (1,279 ms,
SD 0 192 ms, and 908 ms, SD 0 100 ms, respectively),
F(1, 29) 0 268.24, p < .001. These longer processing times
resulted in a lower rate of series correctly recalled (.58, SD 0
.27, and .73, SD 0 .19, for the word and digit conditions,
respectively), F(1, 29) 0 15.78, p < .01. However, as in the
first experiment, word multiplications involved more errors
(8 %, SD 0 4%) than did digit multiplications (5 %, SD 0
3%), F(1, 29) 0 21.90, p < .001. Because the rate of errors
was lower than in the first experiment, it was possible to keep
only the trials on which no error was committed on the
arithmetic task. Those participants who had fewer than 3
remaining trials in one or both conditions were discarded from
the analysis. The 25 remaining participants had a mean of 4.3
trials in the word condition and 5.5 trials in the digit condition,
with mean response times of 1,274 ms (SD 0 188 ms) and
893 ms (SD 0 104 ms) for the word and digit conditions,
respectively, F(1, 24) 0 274.04, p < .001. Although the
remaining trials did not involve any error on the arithmetic
task, the word condition still involved more forgetting of
spatial information than did the digit condition (rates of series
correctly recalled of .63, SD 0 .29, and .84, SD 0 .20, respec-
tively), F(1, 24) 0 18.63, p < .001, an effect that remained
significant even when the order of recall was not taken
into account (.68, SD 0 .27, and .87, SD 0 .19, respectively),
F(1, 24) 0 15.40, p < .001.
General discussion
In two experiments, we observed that increasing the time
during which attention was occupied by a concurrent process-
ing activity while the time available for refreshing memory
traces was kept constant resulted in lower recall performance.
Most important, this result was observed for both verbal and
visuospatial memory, whereas the intervening tasks remained
unchanged, a result difficult to reconcile with interference
accounts of forgetting. Indeed, if it can be assumed that
Fig. 2 Rate of series of letters and spatial locations correctly recalled
as a function of the format of presentation of the multiplications
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encoding number words activates verbal representations sus-
ceptible to interference with letters to a greater extent than
does encoding digits, it is more difficult to imagine that
solvingmultiplications presented inword format involves more
visuospatial representations than does solving the same multi-
plications in digit format. Seitz and Schumann-Hengsteler
(2000), who studied the role of working memory resources in
mental multiplication, observed that a visuospatial tapping task
has no effect at all in solving multiplications, suggesting that
solving small multiplications, such as those we used here, does
not involve visuospatial representations. Thus, an interference
account of forgetting would not predict that solving multipli-
cations presented in word format should have a greater effect
on the maintenance and recall of visuospatial information than
solving these operations presented in digit format. On the
contrary, we observed that processing word multiplications still
induced more forgetting and lower recall performance even
when visuospatial information was to be memorized. When
error rates were equalized, the size of the effect induced by the
longer processing times in the word condition was equivalent
in both experiments (from .54 to .74 with verbal memoranda
and from .63 to .84 with visuospatial memoranda; Fig. 2). The
total absence of an interaction between the format of the
intervening task (either words or digits) and the nature of the
memoranda (either letters or spatial locations) supports the
hypothesis that memory traces, whatever their nature, suffer
from a temporal decay as long as attention is diverted by
concurrent activities, as is assumed by the TBRS model of
working memory (Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2007; Barrouillet,
Portrat, & Camos 2011; Vergauwe et al., 2009; Vergauwe et al.,
2010). Our findings also mesh with and extend recent empir-
ical findings suggesting that at least some features of memory
traces decay with time (Barrouillet, Portrat, Vergauwe,
Diependaele, & Camos, 2011; Cowan & AuBuchon, 2008;
Ricker & Cowan, 2010).
A possible alternative account would be to assume that
the longer periods of attentional capture elicited by the word
multiplications and the longer retention interval they involve
would create more proactive interference. Such a hypothesis
predicts that recall performance would progressively decline
with tests, which determine the number of prior interfering
associations, with a stronger decline in the word condition
(Keppel & Underwood, 1962). To test this hypothesis, we
compared in both experiments recall performance on the
first four and the last four trials in each condition. Contrary
to the proactive interference hypothesis, the difference in
recall between the two conditions did not significantly vary
from the first to the last part of the experiments and was
even slightly smaller on the last 4 trials, in Experiment 1
(rates of .43 and .71 of series correctly recalled in the word and
digit conditions, respectively, over the first four trials, as com-
pared with .58 and .75 over the last four trials), F(1, 18) 0 1.03,
p 0 .32, as well as in Experiment 2 (.53 and .71 in the word and
digit conditions, respectively, over the first four trials, as com-
pared with .65 and .80 for the last four trials), F < 1. In fact,
differences between conditions were present from the very first
trial (.32 and .68 for the word and digit conditions, respective-
ly, in Experiment 1, and .40 and .60, respectively, in Experi-
ment 2). The facts that recall performance did not decline with
tests, that the difference between conditions remained un-
changed over trials, and that it was present on the very first
trial do not fit very well with a proactive interference account.
Another alternative explanation would be to assume that
forgetting depends not on temporal decay, but on the amount
of attention used by the concurrent activity within a working
memory in which processing and storage activities would be
performed in parallel and fueled by a limited amount of shared
attention. Word multiplications might use attention more in-
tensively, resulting in poorer recall. However, we have shown
elsewhere that intervening processing in complex span tasks
have a detrimental effect on storage commensurate with their
duration, whatever their nature (Barrouillet et al., 2007;
Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011).
Overall, the simplest way to explain the present findings
is to assume that memory traces decay with time when
attention is not available to counteract temporal decay. This
is not to say that representation-based interference does not
play any role in forgetting, and we have already suggested
that both temporal decay and representation-based interfer-
ence could concur to produce forgetting from working
memory (Barrouillet et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the present
results add to the growing body of evidence that working
memory strongly depends on time-related factors and con-
stitute a further evidence for temporal decay in the short
term, suggesting that the causal effect of time on forgetting
cannot be easily dismissed.
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